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THE ROLE OF MEDICARE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM
WILLIAM M. SAGE*
The medical malpractice crisis we think we are in is not the medical
malpractice crisis we actually are in. Today's malpractice crisis is not an epidemic
of lawsuits, impressionable juries, or even excessive insurance premiums. The real
medical malpractice crisis is that the law has formed little connection between the
malpractice system and the health care system.
I. MALPRACTICE AND HEALTH POLICY
There are many ways in which medical liability affects cost, access, and
quality in health care-which are universally accepted as the central considerations
in health policy. It is well known among academics that there is a two-sided
mismatch between negligence and litigation.' Some lawsuits are not grounded in
provable negligence, but there are also high rates of uncompensated injury and
avoidable medical error.2 Procedures for resolving medical malpractice disputes,
to use a technical term, are just plain lousy. Physicians and patients who should be
intimates are recast as strangers and adversaries in an expensive, protracted,
tactical dance. Moreover, both malpractice litigation and malpractice insurance
focus on individual physicians rather than on organizational care processes that we
know are responsible for the majority of preventable medical injuries.
" Vice Provost for Health Affairs and James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence in Law, The
University of Texas at Austin. A.B., Harvard University, 1982; M.D., J.D., Stanford University, 1988.
This essay was adapted from the Stuart Rome Lecture delivered at the University of Maryland School
of Law on October 28, 2005, in conjunction with a conference titled "Beyond the New Medical
Malpractice Legislation: New Opportunities, Creative Solutions, and Best Practices for Patient Safety,
Tort Reform and Patient Compensation." The article is supported by a grant from the Commonwealth
Fund to the author and to Professor Eleanor D. Kinney at the University of Indiana-Indianapolis School
of Law to study Medicare's role in malpractice reform. Data from Texas contained in this essay is from
the project on medical malpractice at the University of Texas School of Law, and was provided by
Professors Bernard Black, Charles Silver, and David Hyman. The author also thanks Myungho Paik
and Benjamin Wallfisch of the University of Texas for research assistance.
1. See HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 6 (1990) (finding that
while many claims of negligence were unsubstantiated, other patients who suffered injuries from
negligence did not file lawsuits); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1618-20 (2002)
(summarizing studies which analyzed "the problem of poor fit" between claims of medical negligence
and actual injuries from medical negligence).
2. In the Harvard Medical Practice Study, approximately one-eighth of events judged negligent
by the researchers led to malpractice litigation, and only half of those were eventually compensated.
For every valid claim filed, roughly six were filed with respect to non-negligent care. Mello &
Brennan, supra note 1, at 1619; see also HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 1, at 6.
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We need to turn a comer in medical malpractice policy. The old Clinton
campaign mantra "It's the economy, stupid" can be restated for medical
malpractice as "It's patient care, stupid." For the most part, the malpractice reform
debate has been about things outside of the health care system, such as lawyers,
courts, or the supposed litigiousness of the American public.3 Many of the
presentations at the University of Maryland conference, "Beyond the New Medical
Legislation: New Opportunities, Creative Solutions, and Best Practices for Patient
Safety, Tort Reform and Patient Compensation," were about patient care, and that
is wonderful. But even in Dr. Deborah Roter's presentation, which applied "thin-
slice" analysis to physician-patient communication, the connection between the
malpractice side and the patient care side seemed tentative.4 It is not merely that
bad communication leads to malpractice litigation. Bad communication is bad
medicine.5
Malpractice reform is fundamentally about resolving problems with medical
care. 6 In its 2001 report, Crossing the Quality Chasm, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) argued that a high quality health care system should be safe, effective,
patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable.7  I believe that the current
medical malpractice system furthers none of those goals. The solution is to
integrate malpractice policy with health policy. A better malpractice system
requires a better health care system, and a better health care system requires a
better malpractice system.8 That is what I am hoping to give voice and substance
to in this essay discussing Medicare's role in malpractice reform.
3. See William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1, 1-2 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003) (describing the medical community's
view of malpractice lawsuits as "patient opportunism and lawyer entrepreneurship").
4. See Debra Roter, The Patient-Physician Relationship and its Implications for Malpractice
Litigation, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 304, 310-11 (2006).
5. See William M. Sage, Editorial, Putting the Patient in Patient Safety: Linking Patient
Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287 JAMA 3003, 3004-05 (2002) (suggesting a system-wide
incorporation of "patient perspectives" to minimize the risk of malpractice litigation).
6. There is an increasing recognition of the need for a systems-oriented approach. See, e~g.,
JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., SETTING THE STANDARD: THE JOINT
COMMISSION & HEALTH CARE SAFETY AND QUALITY I (2005), available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/6C33FEDB-BB50-4CEE-950B-A6246DA491 I E/0/
setting the standard.pdf.
7. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 3 (2001), available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/8089/5432/27184.aspx.
8. By contrast, most tort reformers seek simply to discourage malpractice claims and reduce
recoveries. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Scranton (Jan. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0l/20030116-1.html; OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING
COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf; Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis':
Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Jan. 20, 2004, at
W4-20-W4-2 1, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.20v I/DC I.
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Why is malpractice policy not part of health policy? I won't belabor the
question, but will make some educated guesses. Part of the disconnect derives
from 150 years of antagonism between doctors and lawyers.9 Another part has to
do with politics. The politics of the malpractice crisis that began in 2002 are
strikingly different from the politics of the crises of the 1970s and 1980s.'
Malpractice politics today are subsumed by the overall politics of general tort
reform. This country is embroiled in a deep partisan and ideological debate over
the effect of personal injury lawyers on the American economy and social fabric. II
This is not fundamentally a debate about health care, although constituencies on
both sides use health care whenever it is convenient to support their general
arguments. 
1 2
Periodicity is another barrier between malpractice and health policy. 13  I
sometimes describe medical malpractice as the "Rip Van Winkle" issue of
American health care because it wakes up every decade or two rather than evolving
as general health policy evolves. Each reprise merely echoes the previous debate.
A final barrier that I think bears emphasis, and that leads towards the
Medicare-related proposals that I discuss, is government structure. Malpractice
has been a judicial branch issue, while health care has been a legislative and
executive branch issue. Malpractice has been a state law issue, while health care is
governed increasingly by federal law. The ascendance of federal law is attribu-
table to the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, but those major
programs have been invisible where medical malpractice is concerned.
II. PATHS TO COMPREHENSIVE MALPRACTICE REFORM
To appreciate the need for testing dramatic alternatives to the existing
malpractice system, one must consider how malpractice looks as a public policy
problem now compared to twenty years ago. The medical malpractice system has
three parts: legal process, health care delivery, and liability insurance. Before the
Harvard Medical Practice Study, before the patient safety movement, and before
the IOM's reports, medical malpractice reform seemed only to be about frivolous
9. JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 105 (1993) (describing early antipathy between doctors and lawyers); William M.
Sage, The Lawyerization of Medicine, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 302-17 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003).
10. Sage, supra note 3, at 2.
11. See Postings of William M. Sage to PointofLaw, http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/condition
-critical 1205.php (Nov. 14, 2005, 10:18 EST - Dec. 6, 2005, 11:18 EST); Postings of James R. Copland
to PointofLaw, http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/condition-criticall205.php (Nov. 14, 2005, 01:50
EST - Nov. 24, 2005, 02:38 EST). See generally Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of
America's Civil Justice System, 47 SMU L. REV. 359 (1994) (describing the negative effect of
litigiousness and the costs of the tort system on the American economy, society, and culture).
12. Sage, supra note 3, at 4-6.
13. Id. at 1-2.
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lawsuits and excessive damage awards-in other words about the tort system.' 4
Malpractice reform today also is about inadequate compensation for injury,
excessive rates of medical error, a poor litigation process, and unnecessarily
volatile liability insurance premiums.
Patient safety has become incorporated into the rhetoric of malpractice
reform, but liability insurance is still ignored, particularly in reforms with high
public visibility.1 5 If we are to avoid recurring problems with insurance avail-
ability and affordability that send lobbyists scurrying to state legislatures seeking
general tort reform, it is crucial to find public policy vehicles for looking at the
insurance side of the medical liability crisis. Specifically, liability insurance
should be structured and priced to reduce the burden on physicians in a few "high-
risk" specialties to finance the coverage needs of an increasingly industrialized,
coordinated health care system.
Something else that has revealed itself in this crisis is that premium volatility
for hospitals and institutional providers, unlike for physicians, is seldom related to
their primary coverage.' 6 Hospitals are large enough to self-insure or negotiate
acceptable experience-rated primary coverage; what they cannot afford these days
is excess layer coverage (the risk corridor from, say, five to 50 million dollars).
Excess layer coverage is the major source of hospitals' financial anxiety about
malpractice. It is also an opportunity for government to offer financial assistance
with excess coverage in exchange for improvements in error prevention and
compensation at the institutional level.
Put it all together, and we need comprehensive malpractice reform, not just
measures to discourage lawsuits and limit financial recoveries. A few steps toward
reform can be taken voluntarily by individuals or institutions. For example, I
strongly favor immediate disclosure of medical errors to patients, apology where
appropriate, and early mediated discussions about safety improvements and fair
compensation.' 7 Doug Wojcieszak of Sorry Works! is right when he tells
physicians to apologize for errors because "you don't need the politicians to help
you."'18 However, we also need sources of systematic reform that can address the
broader problems that I have identified.
14. Id.
15. William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 463, 463-64 (2005).
16. Id. at 479.
17. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287 JAMA 2951, 2951
(2002) (concluding that patient complaints are correlated with physicians' malpractice risk).
18. See Doug Wojcieszak, The Sorry Works! Coalition: Executive Summary, SORRYWORKS.NET,
http://www.sorryworks.net/Whatls.phtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (encouraging physicians and
insurers to "be honest when mistakes happen, offer apologies, and provide compensation up-front to
patients and their attorneys").
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There are three possible avenues for comprehensive reform, meaning reform
that includes improvements to patient safety and liability insurance as well as
dispute resolution. First, state-based demonstration projects of the sort the IOM
recommended in 2002 would be able to test administrative compensation systems
and other less adversarial mechanisms for identifying, compensating, and
ultimately preventing medical errors.' 9 Second, employer initiatives might be an
avenue for malpractice reform experiments. The so-called "ERISA shield," as
currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives private employers considerable
leeway to develop innovative programs that take malpractice disputes involving
beneficiaries of employment-based health coverage out of the courts.20 However,
private employers have conflicting interests where tort reform is concerned. They
want better, safer medical care for their workers, but they also want to reduce
lawsuits against business generally. It is very hard for private employers, I
suspect, to support major initiatives that attempt systematic restructuring of the
malpractice system, because those initiatives might sap energy from general tort
reform efforts that employers have supported for decades. Some innovative
employer coalitions might try it, such as the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare
Initiative, or perhaps the Pacific Business Group on Health.
The third possibility-and the focus of this article-is to jumpstart reform
through the Medicare program by sponsoring federal demonstration projects that
would change the way that Medicare beneficiaries are treated when medical care
causes unexpected injury. There are four major reasons why Medicare should take
a leadership role in malpractice reform. I will state them briefly and then describe
each in some detail. First, conventional malpractice litigation serves Medicare
beneficiaries very poorly. Elderly patients file fewer claims and receive lower
payments when they do pursue legal action. Second, Medicare brings both patient
care and insurance directly into the malpractice debate. Medicare is a progressive
presence in quality improvement, patient safety, and pay for performance. The
federal government also is uniquely positioned to offer reinsurance to health care
institutions in exchange for improving the performance of the malpractice system.
Third, Medicare has significant procedural advantages over conventional litigation
in terms of dispute resolution. Notably, Medicare's existing administrative system
19. INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM
DEMONSTRATIONS 81-89 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter FOSTERING RAPID
ADVANCES] (proposing state-based demonstrations in categories including chronic care, information
and communications technology infrastructure, state health insurance, and liability as part of a "major
redesign of health care processes").
20. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (invalidating as preempted by
ERISA a state law allowing claims for medical complications arising from a benefits determination);
see also Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole
Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY, L. & ETHICS 89 (2005); Karen A. Jordan, Recent
Modifications to the Preemption Doctrine & Their Impact on State HMO Liability Laws, I IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 53, 57-58 (2004).
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of adjudication for benefits disputes constitutes a promising foundation for a
"health court." Fourth, Medicare politics are more oriented to health care than are
the general politics of tort reform.
A. Malpractice Litigation and the Elderly
How do the elderly fare in conventional malpractice litigation? Let us
examine data from Texas on the outcome of malpractice claims.2' A handful of
states collect data on malpractice insurance, but only Texas and Florida make that
information widely available, even to researchers.22 The Texas Department of
Insurance (TDI) closed claim database is unique. Since 1988, property and
casualty insurers have been required to file reports on all payments made on
medical malpractice claims.23 The Texas data has some limitations. We do not
know detailed information, such as claimant age, about payments of less than
$25,000 (not adjusted for inflation), and we do not know anything about claims
24that do not generate payments. We cannot match payments to physician
specialties. We do not know clinical details such as cause or severity of injury.
But the Texas database is mandated by law, and its reports are complete and
reliable, at least from 1990 on, once insurers became accustomed to the reporting
system.
2 5
How often do elderly patients receive payment on malpractice claims? There
were nearly 12,000 malpractice payments of $25,000 or more (in 1988 dollars)
made in malpractice cases in Texas between 1990 and 2003, which totaled $3.8
billion. 26 Senior citizens generated 16% of these paid claims. 27 Adults aged 19-64
generated 64%, children aged 1-18 generated 9%, and infants under one generated
11% (mainly representing neonatal injuries). 28 These are raw numbers. They are
not adjusted for the size of the population of each of those age groups in Texas or,
more importantly, for the "opportunity" to be injured by health care as measured
by hospitalizations, physician visits, or other units of medical service.
21. The data contained in this section is explained in greater detail in William M. Sage et al.,
Medicare Beneficiaries and Malpractice Litigation: Data from Texas (2006) (working paper on file with
author) [hereinafter Data from Texas].
22. Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas,
1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 211 (2005).
23. Id. at 213-15.
24. See id at 215 (describing the aggregate reports filed by insurers of claims with total payments
of $10,000 or less).
25. Data from 1988 and 1989 are limited by underreporting. Id Beginning with 1990, TDI's
reconciliation and review process makes this data more reliable. Id.
26. Data from Texas, supra note 21, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4, 7.
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We can say more about two groups, people ageed 65 and over, and people
aged 1-64. Because we know what percentage of medical services is financed by
Medicare compared to other payers, we can control for how many days elderly and
non-elderly Texans spent in the hospital during the study period. We will omit
neonatal admissions and claims, and adult admissions and claims related to labor
and delivery.
Between 1990 and 2003, there was only one large malpractice payment on
behalf of an elderly patient for every 50,000 days that elderly patients spent in the
hospital. 29 An elderly patient was only 20% as likely as a non-elderly patient to be
paid on a large malpractice claim.30 On the other hand, paid claims for elderly
patients are increasing at over 14% annually, and wrongful death claims for elderly
patients are increasing at 20% annually.31 Paid claims for other age groups are not
increasing.
3 2
What about payment amounts? From 1990 through 2003, the median
payment for claimants ages 65 and over was $113,000, compared to $129,000 for
ages 19-64, $155,000 for ages 1-18, and $218,000 for neonatal claimants (who
often have suffered lifelong disability).33 Mean payment amounts look even more
disadvantageous to the elderly than do medians: $287,000 for ages 19-64 versus
$198,000 for ages 65 and over.34 It is striking that, of the 100 largest payouts
during the study period, only one case involved an elderly patient. Overall, elderly
claimants receive on average 31% less on paid claims than non-elderly adult
plaintiffs. 35 In regression analysis, for every one-year increase in a patient's age,
payments decrease by 0.5% (again, excluding the neonatal group). Over time,
however, payment amounts (in constant dollars) to elderly claimants are
increasing, while those to other age groups are not.
There are several possible explanations for why the elderly fare poorly in
malpractice litigation.36 Elderly patients tend not to realize that they have suffered
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10 ("Paid claims for patients aged 65+ increased on average 14% annually.... [But there
was] an even sharper increase over time (20% annually) in paid wrongful death claims for elderly
patients .... ).
32. Id.; see also Black et al., supra note 22, at 209.
33. Data from Texas, supra note 21, at 7.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Studies from the 1980s also showed that elderly patients are less likely to obtain compensation
for injury through malpractice litigation. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: MEDICARE/MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES ACCOUNT FOR A RELATIVELY SMALL
PERCENTAGE OF MALPRACTICE LOSSES 3, 19 (1993) (noting that "Medicare patients' percentage of
hospital malpractice awards is significantly lower than their portion of hospital discharges and inpatient
days.") [hereinafter GAO, MALPRACTICE LOSSES]; see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONG., DO MEDICAID AND MEDICARE PATIENTS SUE PHYSICIANS MORE OFTEN THAN OTHER
PATIENTS? 13-14 (1992) (finding that Medicare patients sue "less frequently than expected given their
2006]
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negligent injuries. Even if they recognize a problem, seniors depend on their
doctors and hospitals and often do not want to alienate them by filing a lawsuit. If
elderly patients do seek redress, their lower remaining life expectancies and
reduced employment rates are less likely to generate damages substantial enough
to induce lawyers, who are often paid on contingency, to accept them as clients.
Lawyers also know that it is difficult to settle cases involving elderly clients
because causation of injury is seldom clear-cut in patients with pre-existing
illnesses. Nor can elderly clients easily endure the long delays involved in
litigation; in our data, the median claim took over three years to resolve.
There are also potential explanations for the trend toward convergence with
non-elderly claimants, including changing public expectations regarding life
expectancy and quality of life for seniors. It would be interesting to consider how
Texas compares to Florida, a state with a much higher elderly population and the
only other state that allows researchers access to its database of paid malpractice
claims.37 Might there be greater parity in Florida because its jury pools sympathize
with the elderly more than in Texas? Nursing home litigation also may have a
regularizing effect. As lawyers take cases involving elder abuse or neglect in
nursing homes, they become accustomed to making arguments on behalf of seniors
and to finding experts who can help them prove significant damages in court.
The takeaway message from our Texas data is that elderly patients are poorly
compensated by the current system of malpractice litigation. Over time, however,
claims involving elderly patients are becoming a greater burden on the malpractice
system. It is rare, in my experience, for someone with a policy proposal to appeal
simultaneously to tort law defenders and tort law reformers. But this may be one
such case. On one hand, it is necessary to improve access to compensation for
seniors who suffer medical injury. On the other hand, doing nothing may well lead
to problems of cost and unpredictability as tort litigation involving elderly patients
expands. A reason to begin reform now through Medicare is to remedy the former
injustice without an epidemic of litigation that might dissuade physicians from
treating Medicare patients. If Medicare does not begin to take ownership of the
issue, moreover, medical liability will be governed, if at all, by conventional state-
heavy use of health services"); Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of
Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1699 (1993) (discovering that patients
over 65 were "less likely to file malpractice claims than younger patients"). When they are
compensated, Medicare patients tend to receive awards that are half the size of those won by privately
insured patients. See GAO, MALPRACTICE LOSSES, supra, at 13. More recent studies confirm this
disparity, showing that the elderly are less likely to file malpractice claims and suggesting that they are
doubly harmed because they also suffer "higher rates of medical injury." David M. Studdert et al.,
Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 257
(2000).
37. See Neil Vidmar et al., Seeking the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 315 (2005). The Vidmar study does not report findings
based on claimant age.
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based tort reform. In 2003, for example, Texas capped malpractice damages and
made other changes that may reverse current trends toward more frequent claims
and higher payments for elderly plaintiffs.38 Flat caps on damages are a blunt
instrument that I consider undesirable when other, more targeted reforms exist.
39
B. Substantive Benefits of Medicare-Led Malpractice Reform
The need for Medicare to be involved in medical liability should be self-
evident. Only the long, contentious history of malpractice reform, which has
divided federal payment policy from state-based tort law, makes the notion of
Medicare-led reform sufficiently original to merit academic exposition.
Let me share with you some of Medicare's obvious advantages. Medicare is
the largest health insurance program in the nation. Consequently, Medicare often
sets the standard for the entire health care system. Health insurance is first-party
rather than third-party coverage, which positions it to address problems with the
current malpractice system better than malpractice insurance. Third-party liability
insurance exists to protect a policyholder against lawsuits from "outside." It
ignores the fact that, in malpractice cases, the person who is filing the claim is an
intimate, a patient, who deserves something better than to be regarded as stranger
and adversary. By contrast, the interest of a first-party insurer such as Medicare is
to serve the patient-beneficiary directly.
Medicare also is the de facto regulator of American hospitals-either directly
or through the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO).40 Hospitals remain the locus of most serious medical errors, and have
greater financial capacity than individual physicians to bear or insure the costs of
compensating avoidable injuries. Furthermore, if one believes, as most experts do,
that patient safety advances require organized systems of care, Medicare's
indispensability to American hospitals offers a unique opportunity for linking
malpractice reform and quality improvement. Accordingly, in early 2005, JCAHO
38. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301-303 (Vernon 2005).
39. Because malpractice caps reduce the number of large paid claims and the average payout per
claim, they can result in lower insurance premiums. See W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, Damages
Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance 18-20 (Harvard Law School
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No.
467, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=607203. However, there can be undesirable
consequences as well. See David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of
Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 60 & ex. 4, 63 (2004) (finding that flat
caps disproportionately affect severely injured patients, especially those with chronic pain or
disfigurement).
40. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 182 (5th ed.
2004) (describing "deemed status" for JCAHO-approved hospitals). Through prescribed "conditions of
participation," the Medicare program has broad authority to impose, via regulation, operating conditions
on health care institutions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395z (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (2000); 42 C.F.R.
§ 482.1(a)(1)(ii) (2005).
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endorsed demonstrations of comprehensive malpractice reform, including through
Medicare.4'
Medicare is governed by a federal statute, allowing administrators to impose
uniform requirements nationally notwithstanding variation in state constitutions,
statutes, and common law. Medicare has a well-developed administrative
structure, including mechanisms for adjudicating disputes, and enjoys broad
authority to sponsor demonstration projects.42 Lawmakers and administrators have
been trying, since Medicare's inception, both to defend quality in the program and
to make sure that financial waste is reduced.43 Consequently, Medicare deals daily
with difficult questions of medical science and medical economics, and regularly
issues rules, creates or modifies monitoring procedures or bodies, and tests new
ideas.
Consider the conceptual infrastructure necessary for testing radical
malpractice reform (I will return to the procedural infrastructure later). The
recommendations for state-based demonstration projects issued in 2002 by the
TOM recognized that an administrative, non-judicial compensation system for
medical injuries requires a research base, an expert process for turning research
into operational standards for administrative adjudication, and a public process to
ensure that the resulting system meets social criteria regarding rationality and
fairness.
44
Several questions must be answered for a reformed malpractice system
housed in Medicare to become operational. Which injuries should receive
compensation, and based on what evidence? How should "avoidable" injury be
defined? Should certain events be designated as automatically compensable?
Should there be injury thresholds to qualify claimants for compensation? What
scope of error disclosure to patients and families should be required? What
amount of compensatory damages is appropriate, both economic and non-
economic (i.e., pain and suffering)? How should compensation awarded following
preventable injury relate to compensation available from first-party systems of
41. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., HEALTH CARE AT THE
CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM AND PREVENTING
PATIENT INJURY 33, 39 (2005), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/167DD82I-
A395-48FD-87F9-6AB 12BCACB0F/O/MedicalLiability.pdf.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 139511 (2000). For example, the Medicare Modernization Act gives the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) authority to offer "incentives to improve the safety of care
provided to beneficiaries" on a demonstration basis. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646(b)(1), 117 Stat. 2324 (2003) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2005)).
43. E.g., Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 1511, 96 Stat. 383
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (2000)) (creating Peer Review Organizations to perform
utilization review and enforce professionally recognized standards of quality); Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 201(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1371 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(k)) (requiring utilization review for hospital services).
44. FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES, supra note 19, at 85-86.
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health or disability insurance (including the legal question of subrogation rights)?
How should information gathered in the course of awarding compensation be used
for safety improvement? Public policy experts and reform advocates have been
studying these issues for years, but it will take a sustained commitment from
government to resolve them.
Medicare has various ongoing efforts that are intended to improve quality in
health care. Some involve consumer information; 45 others are based on changing
providers' financial incentives; still others involve direct oversight or feedback. A
few, such as the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration,46 apply new
rules selectively to hospitals that elect to participate and fulfill defined
participation criteria. These demonstration programs can include, and can
leverage, malpractice reform.
One approach that has gathered steam in recent months, both within Medicare
and outside it, is "pay for performance. ' '47 I confess to being shameless about
jumping on bandwagons where I think it serves public policy goals.
"Performance" could easily include an improved malpractice system. If avoidable
injury is bad medicine, communicating poorly with patients and their families after
injury is bad medicine, and not compensating patients fairly and promptly is bad
medicine, then Medicare might pay physicians and hospitals for doing these things
better.
How could Medicare pay for this sort of performance? One possibility is
through federally subsidized liability coverage, particularly excess or stop-loss
coverage that is extremely costly to hospitals in downturns of the insurance cycle.
When global insurance capacity is strained, as it has been in recent years primarily
because of natural disasters and terrorism, government can provide affordable,
reliable reinsurance for medium-sized lines of coverage, such as medical liability,
that are too uncertain and too costly to administer to be attractive to commercial
insurers during dips of the insurance cycle. It is likely that hospitals in the current
liability environment would welcome federal assistance, even if it were contingent
45. For example, a new quality tool developed by CMS, Hospital Compare, allows consumers to
access information on the comparative performance of hospitals on health care quality. U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Services, Hospital Compare, http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov (last visited Aug.
30, 2006).
46. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
REWARDING SUPERIOR QUALITY CARE: THE PREMIER HOSPITAL QUALITY INCENTIVE
DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (Jan. 2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityinits/downloads/
HospitalPremierFS200602.pdf.
47. AM. MED. ASS'N, PHYSICIAN PAY FOR PERFORMANCE (PFP) INITIATIVES 4 (2004), available
at http://www.wsma.org/memresources/p4prevised-wc2.pdf; William M. Sage, McDonald-Merrill-
Ketcham Lecture: Pay for Performance: Will It Work In Theory?, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 305 (2006);
William M. Sage & Dev N. Kalyan, Horses or Unicorns: Can Paying For Performance Make Quality
Competition Routine?, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 531 (2006); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver,
You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1427, 1429 (2001).
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on greater accountability for medical error and assurances that they would pay
reasonable compensation for avoidable injury.
The process of qualifying for, as well as agreeing to participate in, a
demonstration of an improved malpractice system is what I call "earn-in." If a
hospital wants to substitute a damage-capped, administrative system of dispute
resolution for conventional tort liability, it has to show that it deserves the
privilege. It has to do things that health care providers should be doing to keep
patients safe and resolve disputes expeditiously. It has to demonstrate its patient
safety infrastructure: the ability to identify, collect, and analyze adverse events. It
has to commit to disclosing unexpected outcomes of care to patients and families.
It has to compensate clearly avoidable injuries promptly and compassionately.
Notice that if providers with these positive attributes are participating in
Medicare malpractice demonstration projects, it gives a very different flavor to
malpractice reform. Instead of conferring tort immunity on providers that are
average, or possibly below average, we would be conferring tort immunity on
providers that can prove themselves above average. That changes the nature of the
debate. Those institutions have earned the right to participate in a better system;
we are not just sheltering them from the legal consequences of their mistakes.
C. Procedural Advantages of a Medicare-Based Malpractice System
Let us turn to Medicare's capacity for dispute resolution, which offers
significant advantages over most alternatives, including generic "health courts"
proposals. Medicare offers a federal administrative law-as opposed to a state tort
law-model for resolving malpractice cases. Administrative law proposals have
an established place in the history of malpractice reform. In the late 1980s, the
American Medical Association (AMA) and many physician specialty societies
proposed an intricate, scholarly model for a fault-based administrative system of
malpractice dispute resolution.48 Many of its features are strikingly similar to what
many public policy experts are talking about today, in particular its commitment to
preserving accountability for error.
48. AM. MED. Ass'N, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING
MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1988); see also COMM. TO
STUDY ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYS., PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS 125-
62 (1989) (outlining four proposals for changes to the judicial compensation system from concerned
organizations); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1989) (describing the AMA proposal). See
generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future
Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99 (1995) (providing a general background on malpractice
reforms, especially this "second generation" of reforms).
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Proposals like the IOM's 49 or JCAHO's 5° that apply an "avoidability"
standard instead of a classic "negligence" standard to determine eligibility for
compensation are often mislabeled "no-fault" reforms.51 The term "no-fault"
should be reserved for situations of true accident, where the transaction costs of
assessing fault are so high, and the usefulness of those determinations for future
injury prevention so limited, that it is simpler just to pay compensation and spread
the cost as broadly as possible. Nobody, not the medical profession, not the patient
safety community, and not the general public, thinks that medical errors should be
written off as accidental.
The current generation of "no-trial" ideas, like the AMA's fault-based system
fifteen years ago, is more accurately analogized to systems of strict liability for
defective products.52 In strict liability, someone is always held accountable. The
difference between the 1980s and today is which "someone." In the AMA
proposal, it was the individual physician.53 In more recent proposals such as the
IOM's, it tends to be the "enterprise"-a hospital, organized system of care, or
physician group-that is considered responsible, with less blame attaching to
individual professionals.
54
In both the AMA proposal from the 1980s and the IOM proposal from 2002,
the determination that things should have been done better is rendered by an expert
administrative system, not by a trial court of general jurisdiction. I think there are
persuasive reasons for moving as much medical injury compensation as possible
into administrative resolution systems and out of civil litigation. This is not
because I dislike lawyers; obviously, I respect lawyers. But if one asks an
experienced plaintiffs malpractice lawyer how much in damages a case has to
offer for her to consider taking it, the answer usually is around $200,000, reflecting
the high costs of expert witnesses and the long delays that typically precede
settlement or trial. That means anybody who suffers an injury worth less than
$200,000 cannot find a lawyer, or at least a lawyer actually capable of handling a
complex malpractice case. Administrative systems can do better on access-to-
49. FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES, supra note 19, at 82.
50. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., supra note 41, at 13-14.
51. See, e.g., David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No Fault"
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 226-28 (2001); David
M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect for
Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 217 (2001) (using the IOM's mandates to advocate no-fault
reforms).
52. See FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES, supra note 19, at 81.
53. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 48, at ii-iv.
54. FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES, supra note 19, at 83, 86; see also William M. Sage et al.,
Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1, 19 (1994) (discussing the variability in who may be liable for medical malpractice and the
resulting increased transaction costs).
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justice grounds alone, not to mention faster resolution, lower cost, greater
satisfaction for both plaintiff and defendant, and better prevention of future injury.
A striking aspect of the AMA's proposal, which distinguished it from the
routine tort reform of the 1980s, was that it conceded the need to compensate more
injured patients than does litigation. 55 The AMA did not seek to create a system
"on the cheap" that merely would take people who currently go to court and pay
them lesser damages while incurring reduced administrative expense. The AMA
recognized that a major goal of an administrative law-based malpractice system
was to compensate a larger percentage of avoidable injuries.56 I think most current
"health courts" proposals share this basic commitment. 57 1 disagree with people
who argue that saving money is the principal reason to pursue malpractice reform.
It is not just about saving money. It is about better medical care. It is about
dealing constructively with bad situations, for the benefit of both patients and
physicians.
Why do I emphasize the Medicare approach over more general "health
courts" proposals, such as those offered by Philip Howard's organization Common
Good? 58 At a conceptual level, I support Common Good's approach, but I think
generic health courts have three significant limitations in practice. The first
problem is that they are reactive. Patients still have to walk into lawyers' offices
and say that something bad happened to them. And lawyers have to investigate,
and then decide to file claims. A second problem with generic health courts is that
they are stand-alone. They are not connected to anything else that exists to
improve health care quality or assure good patient care. To Common Good's
credit, they and other health court advocates seem genuinely interested in turning
the comer from health courts as a litigation reform to health courts as a health care
reform. But the legal institutions that they propose do not bear any logical relation
to health care delivery or health care regulation. The third problem with health
courts is that they are hypothetical. We do not have them yet, and it will take a lot
of time and political capital to build them.
By contrast, we definitely have Medicare and it is not going away. Medicare
is already immersed in medical quality and can relate malpractice dispute
resolution to its overall health policy mission. As a result, Medicare can take a
55. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 48, at i.
56. Id. at i-ii.
57. See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., supra note 41, at 13.
58. The Common Good Institute advocates establishing health courts with "full-time judges,
dedicated solely to addressing healthcare cases," neutral experts to assist those judges, faster procedures
and lower costs, "liberalized recovery for injured patients," and a fixed-schedule for damages.
COMMON GOOD, AN URGENT CALL FOR SPECIAL HEALTH COURTS: AMERICA NEEDS A RELIABLE
SYSTEM OF MEDICAL JUSTICE (2005), http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/130.pdf (last visited Aug. 30,
2006).
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proactive stance on error detection, compensation, and prevention. Medicare can
find out if something bad happened to a patient, in large part because Medicare
providers can be charged with monitoring and reporting unanticipated outcomes of
care. This is especially true for providers who have voluntarily agreed to test a
new system of dispute resolution as part of a demonstration project. Other health
care regulators, self-regulators, or payers could play a similar anchoring role for
medical courts, including JCAHO, state departments of health, state medical
boards, patient safety authorities in the few states that have created them, and even
large employers and business coalitions. But Medicare is one of our best
opportunities for progress.
A demonstration of Medicare-led malpractice reform would build on
Medicare's established systems for processing and deciding claims over benefits.
Medicare benefit determinations frequently involve medical review by clinical
experts and require decision-makers to estimate disability and future medical
needs, as well as to award compensation based on pre-established schedules. This
experience would also be useful in administering malpractice disputes.5 9 Pursuant
to the Medicare Modernization Act, the administrative law judges (ALJs) who
have traditionally heard Medicare benefit cases and were lodged in the Social
Security Administration have now been brought over to the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). 60 This transition, which is being carefully monitored
to ensure that the ALJs will be independent from HHS in their new role, offers a
unique opportunity to assign a subset of those judges the task of deciding
malpractice cases on a demonstration basis.
6 1
Medicare's less formal dispute resolution processes, which precede and often
avoid administrative and judicial review, would also be relevant to malpractice
reform. 62 Medicare contractors-Part A intermediaries, Part B carriers, and
59. See William M. Sage & Eleanor D. Kinney, A Malpractice System for Medicare, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, eds., forthcoming
2006).
60. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 931(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2396, 2396-99 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2005));
Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,420, 11,422
(Mar. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401 & 405).
61. The new Medicare law requires Medicare ALJs to be located in an office "organizationally and
functionally separate" from CMS, which reports to the Secretary "but shall not report to, or be subject
to supervision by" any other officer within HHS. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act § 931(b)(2).
62. Congress established the current process for Part A and Part B beneficiary appeals in 2000.
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, § 521, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-534 to 543 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2005));
Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 70 Fed. Reg. at 11,420,
11,422; see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures:
Can Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1479-
80 (2003) (describing the changes to the Medicare national and local coverage decision-making
processes under the 2000 Act).
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Medicare Advantage managed care plans-have internal procedures prescribed by
law for handling grievances and disputes over benefits, including independent
medical review.63 Medicare also uses ombudsman programs to help beneficiaries
gather information and air grievances over benefits,64 and is experimenting with
mediation. 65 Furthermore, HHS is involved in developing national coverage
standards, medical practice guidelines, and other procedural and institutional
mechanisms that can be brought to bear on avoidability determinations and damage
calculations for medical injuries. 66  These administrative processes typically
include provisions for soliciting expert and public input, conveying results of
decisions, conducting further appeals, and assembling past practices into coherent
guidance for the future.
D. Medicare Politics and Malpractice
The politics of Medicare often provoke concern and frustration among
academics. As former Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
Administrator Bruce Vladeck explains, Medicare's politics generally divide into
three aspects: redistribution of wealth among citizens, distribution of federal
resources among states, and financial and professional interests of health care
providers and suppliers.67 Medicare is such a large entitlement program that, for
major policy decisions, Medicare politics blend into national fiscal politics, and
political debate becomes less about health care and more about taxation and
budgeting.
For malpractice policy, however, Medicare politics are quite favorable
compared to traditional tort politics. Medicare's potential role in malpractice
63. The contractor makes an initial determination on the coverage or payment claim. 42 U.S.C. §
1395ff(a)(l)(C) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 405.920 (2005). If dissatisfied with the outcome, a beneficiary can
then seek a redetermination by the contractor. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (a)(3) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 405.940
(2005). Independent review of the contractor's determination is available through a qualified
independent contractor (QIC). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff(b)(l)(A), (c)(3)(B)(i) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 405.960
(2005). The process is slightly different for Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-
22(f)-(g); 42 C.F.R. 422.560, 422.564(a), 422.578-90, 422.594 (2005).
64. The 2003 legislation established within HHS a Medicare Beneficiary Ombudsman to assist
Medicare beneficiaries with complaints, grievances, and requests for information with respect to any
aspect of the Medicare program, including appeals from adverse determinations by Medicare
contractors. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, § 923(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2393-95 (2003) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-9
(2005)).
65. See Kathleen Scully-Hayes, Mediation and Medicare Part A Provider Appeals: A Useful
Alternative, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 356, 359 (2002).
66. See generally Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUALITY
REV. BULL. 42 (1990); Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Lai Beyond Clinical
Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
479 (2004).
67. Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, 18 HEALTH AFF. 22, 23-24 (1999).
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reform would have a trivial budgetary impact, so the most intransigent aspects of
Medicare politics don't apply. What are the political advantages? A huge one is
bringing medical injury into federal debate as a health care issue rather than as a
tort litigation issue. Because of Medicare (and Medicaid), the federal government
has a natural, understandable interest in health care. By contrast, asserting a
federal preemptive role in tort litigation generally challenges longstanding
traditions of state-level legal and political control.
This is reflected in the jurisdiction of congressional committees. Malpractice
reform bills have languished each year in Congress because judiciary committees
that have primary jurisdiction over the average malpractice bill are not particularly
interested in health care. They are interested in the legal system, the politics of the
legal system, and the social and economic effects of the legal system. But rarely, if
ever, would they endorse legislation solely on the grounds that it might improve
health care.
If Congress is going to accomplish something with respect to medical
liability, the impetus must come from members of committees that have health care
jurisdiction. Legislation involving Medicare is handled by health and finance
committees. I support a bill, Senate Bill 1337 (the "Fair and Reliable Medical
Justice Act"), which would fund state-based malpractice demonstration projects of
the kinds suggested by the IOM. 68 Not surprisingly, the bill's bipartisan sponsors
play important roles on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and
Finance Committees of the U.S. Senate.69
Engaging the politics of Medicare is also an invitation to important health
care constituencies to add their voices to the malpractice debate. For example, the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is incredibly important to
Medicare and to overall health care, but it has never had any direct involvement
with malpractice policy. The same is true for business coalitions with specific
interests in health insurance and health care purchasing. These groups have been
marginalized not because they are unimportant, but because their input has not
seemed critical to the conventional politics of medical liability. Without a
Medicare component, liability reform will always seem to be about courts and
lawyers and states, not about the health care of the nation.
Any substantial proposal will be regarded skeptically by new political
entrants because of the contentious history of malpractice reform. But these
groups, especially if engaged through Medicare, also offer the best hope of
dislodging the malpractice debate from its current stagnation, and of forging new
coalitions rather than just perpetuating established ones. This can only be
constructive where malpractice policy is concerned.
68. S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 3990 (2005).
69. Sen. Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.), Chairman of the Senate HELP Committee, and Sen. Max Baucus
(D-Mont.), Ranking Member on S. Fin. Comm., co-sponsored S. 1337. Id
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III. CONCLUSION
Medicare can play an important role in improving the medical malpractice
system. A Medicare-based malpractice system can help beneficiaries receive safer
medical care, and experience a quick, comprehensive, and compassionate response
if avoidable injuries nonetheless occur. Medicare's existing administrative appeals
process could serve as the foundation for a truly effective "medical court," and
liability reform could be integrated with Medicare's patient safety, pay for
performance, and consumer information initiatives.
There are, of course, obstacles to be overcome in order for Medicare to take
the lead on malpractice. For example, there are questions regarding the federal
government's constitutional authority and the Medicare program's statutory
authority, absent specific legislation, to replace state-based tort claims with a
mandatory federal administrative remedy that permits limited judicial review but
precludes trial by jury.7° I do not consider these objections to be insuperable as a
legal matter, but I think it a prudent first step for Congress to explicitly authorize a
series of voluntary, Medicare-based demonstration projects.
Reform should begin as a pilot program, not a sweeping reform, with health
care provider "earn-in" incentives to receive federally subsidized medical
malpractice coverage, and Medicare beneficiary "opt-in" incentives designed to
attract widespread, voluntary participation. These would supplement state-based
malpractice demonstration projects funded by S. 1337, if enacted. If this
innovation proves nearly as successful as I hope and believe it will, it can be
replicated and expanded to other provider and beneficiary settings, including
perhaps the Medicaid program. Done right, this approach-more than any other-
could change medical liability from an issue buffeted by tort politics to an issue
governed by health care policy, with long-term benefits for the public and the
health care system.
70. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving Malpractice Claims in the
Medicare Program: Can It Be Done?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 77 (2005).
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